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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Anthony Joe Childers appeals from his sentences for rape and attempted 
strangulation. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Childers, then 28 years old, had sex with a heavily-intoxicated 17-year-old 
girl in the bathroom of a residence during a party attended by other juveniles. 
(PSI, pp.2-3.) Afterward, the victim's friends had to carry her out of the 
bathroom. (PSI, p.3.) After receiving a phone call from a party attendee, the 
victim's mother then arrived and took her to the hospital. (Id.) The victim later 
reported the incident to police. (PSI, pp.2-3.) 
Less than two weeks later, police responded to a report of a domestic fight 
between Childers and another individual, his girlfriend. (PSI, pp.3-4.) After being 
taken into custody, Childers admitted to officers that he grabbed his girlfriend 
around the neck. (PSI, p.4.) Childers also admitted punching and breaking the 
window of a vehicle parked outside. (Id.) Childers' girlfriend told police that 
Childers "choked her" for two minutes, and that she was unable to breathe while 
he was doing so. (Id.) Police observed bruises on her neck and arms. (Id.) 
The state charged Childers with rape, sexual battery of a minor child 
seventeen years of age, attempted strangulation, misdemeanor domestic battery, 
and misdemeanor malicious injury to property. 1 (R., pp.43-45; 131-133.) 
1 The charges related to the rape and domestic violence incidents were assigned 
separate criminal case numbers, but were both addressed at one change of plea 
hearing and one sentencing hearing. (See generally, Tr.) 
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Childers pleaded guilty to rape and attempted 
strangulation, and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.68-70, 
156-158; Tr., p.4, L.7 - p.22, L.3.) The district court ordered a substance abuse 
evaluation, a psychosexual evaluation, and a presentence investigation. (Tr., 
p.22, L.4 - p.22, L.20.) These evaluations were conducted prior to Childers' 
sentencing. (See PSI; 9/21/11 Substance Abuse Evaluation; 9/12/11 
Psychosexual Evaluation; 8/21/11 Disclosure Interview and Polygraph 
Examination Summary.) 
The day of sentencing, Childers requested that the district court 
additionally order a "psychiatric evaluation." (Tr., p.26, L.16 - p.27, L.4; p.28, 
Ls.3-10.) The state objected to the request, arguing that the psychosexual 
evaluation and presentence investigation provided adequate information about 
Childers' mental health, and that Childers' rape victim and her family were 
present in the courtroom for sentencing and had all made sacrifices to be there. 
(Tr., p.27, Ls.12-24.) The district court denied Childers' request, stating that 
while it understood the psychosexual evaluator suggested Childers may benefit 
from psychological treatment or medication, the court did not recognize any 
overriding psychological issues that were at play in this case. (Tr., p.28, Ls.11-
25.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years with three years 
fixed for rape, and a concurrent unified sentence of 10 years with two years fixed 
for attempted strangulation. (R., pp.79-82; 168-171.) Childers timely appealed 
both sentences. (R., pp.99-102; 186-189.) 
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ISSUE 
Childers states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it failed 
to order the requested psychiatric evaluation. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The State rephrases the issue as: 
Has Childers failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
declining his request to order an I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation? 
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ARGUMENT 
Childers Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Declining His Request To Order An I.C. § 19-2522 Psychological Evaluation 
A. Introduction 
Childers contends that the district court erred in declining his day-of-
sentencing request to order a psychological evaluation. (See generally, 
Appellant's brief.) Childers' contention fails because there was no reason to 
believe his mental health would be a significant factor at sentencing, and in any 
event, Childers' previously ordered substance abuse evaluation, psychosexual 
evaluation, and presentence investigation provided the court with adequate 
information about Childers' mental health and rehabilitative prospects. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[A] court possesses discretion to order or decline to order a mental health 
examination prior to sentencing or at disposition pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524." 
State v. Hanson, 150 Idaho 729,732,249 P.3d 1184, 1187 (Ct. App. 2011). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Decline To Order An 
Additional Mental Health Evaluation 
Idaho Code § 19-2522(1) states that "[i]f there is reason to believe the 
mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for 
good cause shown," the court shall appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to 
evaluate and report upon the defendant's mental condition to inform the court's 
sentencing decision. The legislature's purpose behind giving trial courts this 
ability to order a mental health examination prior to sentencing decisions is to 
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"broaden[ ] a court's sentencing options related to the treatment for substance 
abuse or mental health issues." Hanson, 150 Idaho at 732, 249 P.3d at 1187 
(citing Statement of Purpose, SB 1149 (2007)). 
Idaho Code § 19-2522(3) also states that, should a psychological 
evaluation be ordered, the accompanying report must include the following: 
(a) A description of the nature of the examination; 
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of 
the defendant; 
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect 
and level of functional impairment; 
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the 
defendant's mental condition; 
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
nontreatment; 
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may 
create for the public if at large. 
I.C. § 19-2522(3). 
"A psychological evaluation is not required in every case where the 
defendant claims some mental illness or disability." State v. Jockumsen, 148 
Idaho 817, 822, 229 P.3d 1179, 1184 (Ct. App. 2010). "Rather, the decision of 
whether to obtain a psychological evaluation lies within the sentencing court's 
discretion." kl (citing I.C.R. 32(d); State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195 
P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189, 45 P.3d 844, 
845 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Jones, 132 Idaho 439, 442, 974 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct. 
App. 1999)). 
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"As with any discretionary determination, however, the district court's 
action must be consistent with the applicable legal standards." State v. 
McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879, 876 P.2d 158, 161 (Ct. App. 1994). "A district 
court's election not to order a psychological evaluation will be upheld on appeal if 
the record can support a finding that there was no reason to believe a 
defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing or if the 
information already before the court adequately met the requirements of I.C. § 
19-2522(3)." Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822, 229 P.3d at 1184 (emphasis added, 
citations omitted). In this case, the record supports a finding that there was no 
reason to believe Childers' mental condition would be a significant factor at 
sentencing, and that evaluations and other information already before the court 
adequately met the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). 
Childers' mental condition was not a significant factor at sentencing 
because it was not a "key underlying factor in [his] commission of the crime." See 
State v. Shultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288, 233 P.3d 732, 735 (Ct. App. 2010) (stating 
that "[a]lthough not exclusive, a defendant's mental condition can be a significant 
factor at sentencing when that condition may be a key underlying factor in the 
defendant's commission of the crime, especially when the actions are a serious 
departure from the defendant's history and character."). 
There is no indication on the record that Childers' mental health was a key 
underlying factor in his rape or attempted strangulation of his victims. Instead, 
the narrative presented by the evaluators and Childers himself revolved around 
his substance abuse. (See generally 9/21/11 Substance Abuse Evaluation; PSI.) 
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Childers told officers he was "really really drunk" prior to the rape, and that he 
had "15 beers, rum and vodka" prior to the attempted strangulation. (PSI, pp.3-
4.) The substance abuse evaluator found that Childers "[met] lifetime criteria for 
substance dependence," and recommended that Childers undergo Level II 
Intensive Outpatient treatment. (9/21/11 Substance Abuse Evaluation, pp.3, 7.) 
Childers acknowledged to the presentence investigator that he changes and acts 
irrationally when he drinks, and the investigator commented that Childers used 
his drinking to excuse his behavior. (PSI, pp.12, 16.) During the sentencing 
hearing, Childers' defense counsel stated that Childers has a severe alcohol 
dependence that was "the precipitating factor in both of these events." (Tr., p.40, 
Ls. 7-13.) Childers' actions were consistent with his long history as a substance 
abuser and were not the result of any temporary inexplicable behavioral 
aberration caused by a mental condition. 
Further, the fact that the psychosexual evaluator opined that Childers' 
substance abuse "may be his attempt to self-medicate and cope with his 
negative emotion" (9/12/11 Psychosexual Evaluation, p.18), does not transform 
Childers' mental health into a "significant factor at sentencing." Certainly, 
substance abuse can often, if not always, have an emotional component, but the 
legislature has not required district courts to order a separate, dedicated 
psychological evaluation if there is any reason to be believe a defendant's 
substance abuse will be a significant factor at sentencing. 
As the district court recognized, the evaluations and other information in 
the record revealed only moderate indicators of mental health issues. Childers 
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scored in the "no/minimal range" of the Internal Mental Distress Scale, Behavior 
Complexity Scale, and Cognitive Impairment Screen as part of his substance 
abuse evaluation. (9/21/11 Substance Abuse Evaluation, p.4.) Childers reported 
to his substance abuse evaluator that he was not significantly disturbed by any 
kind of "nerve, mental, or psychological problems" in the last year. (Id., p.4.) 
Childers informed his presentence investigator that he would not benefit from 
mental health counseling. (PSI, p.11.) The psychosexual evaluator found that 
Childers "[did] not meet criteria for a DSM-IV diagnosis for a major mental 
illness," and Childers "denied current symptoms consistent with either clinical 
depression or anxiety" during that evaluation. (9/12/11 Psychosexual Evaluation 
pp.6, 15.) 
While the evaluations did indicate that Childers was "emotionally 
immature," had "not been able to sustain an independent adult lifestyle for very 
long," had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and a 
mood disorder during his childhood, and was in need of anger management 
treatment (9/12/11 Psychosexual Evaluation, pp.17-18), these findings do not 
rise to the level that would compel, rather than merely permit, a district court to 
order a separate, dedicated, psychological evaluation. In his comments at the 
sentencing hearing, the district court did not discuss Childers' mental health 
independent of the maturity and behavioral issues raised by the psychosexual 
evaluator. (Tr., p.44, L.11 - p.49, L.7); see Hanson, 152 Idaho at_, 271 P.3d 
at 718 ("A district court's decisions or comments at sentencing may also 
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demonstrate that the defendant's mental condition was a significant factor in 
determining the sentence."). 
Childers' argument that the district court erred relies heavily on the final 
page of the psychosexual evaluation which recommends that Childers have "a 
psychiatric evaluation to determine if psychotropic medications would be of 
benefit to him." (9/12/11 Psychosexual Evaluation, p.18.) The evaluator did not 
specifically recommend that the evaluation take place prior to sentencing to 
assist the district court's sentencing determination. (Id.) The district court was 
aware of the recommendation (Tr., p.26, Ls.16-22), but ultimately declined to 
follow it prior to sentencing. In light of the absence of information in the record 
that Childers' mental health issues rose to a level where they would be a 
significant factor at sentencing, or represented a "key underlying factor in [his] 
commission of the crime," the district court was permitted to decline the 
psychosexual evaluator's recommendation. Idaho Code § 19-2522 does not 
require district courts to order a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing in 
every instance where, as in this case, the record merely indicates that a 
defendant may possibly benefit from psychological treatment or medication. 
Such a standard would likely require a psychological evaluation before most, if 
not all, felony sentencings. 
Furthermore, even assuming that Childers' mental health issues were a 
significant factor at sentencing, the district court had ample evidence regarding 
Childers' mental condition and the I.C. § 19-2522(3) criteria. The substance 
abuse evaluator measured Childers' mental condition on the Internal Mental 
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Distress Scale, Behavior Complexity Scale, and Cognitive Impairment Screen, 
and inquired and reported on factors such as the existence of stress disorders, 
psychological problems, anger, cognitive impairment, and history of 
psychological treatment. (9/21/11 Substance Abuse Evaluation, pp.4-5.) The 
psychosexual evaluator reported on Childers' mental health diagnosis and 
treatment history, inquired as to symptoms consistent with clinical depression or 
anxiety, evaluated Childers' incentives to change his behavior and his 
amenability to treatment, thoroughly assessed his risk for re-offense, and 
recommended substance abuse, anger, and sex offender treatment. (See 
generally, 9/12/11 Psychosexual Evaluation.) 
The Idaho appellate courts have recognized that a competency 
evaluation, even when properly utilized by a district court in its sentencing 
analysis, is unlikely to adequately substitute for a I.C. § 19-2522 psychological 
evaluation because it serves a fundamentally different purpose. State v. Carter, 
_ P.3d _, 2012 WL 386591, * 6-7 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. Banbury, 
145 Idaho 265, 270, 178 P.3d 630, 635 (Ct. App. 2007); McFarland, 125 Idaho at 
881, 876 P.2d at 163.) However, a psychosexual evaluation, unlike a 
competency evaluation, but like a I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation, is 
specifically prepared to assist the district court at sentencing and, as in this case, 
reports on factors such as danger to society, rehabilitative prospects, and 
treatment options. See I.C. §§ 18-8314; 18-8316. Thus, a psychosexual 
evaluation is much more likely to serve as an adequate substitute for an I.C. § 
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19-2522 psychological evaluation, especially when combined, as in this case, 
with a substance abuse evaluation and recent presentence investigation report. 
On appeal, Childers specifically contends that the existing evaluations and 
record lacked information addressing the criteria required by I.C. § 19-2522(3)(d) 
and (e): "[a] consideration of whether treatment is available for the defendant's 
mental condition" and "[a]n analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment 
or nontreatment." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) These two criteria have limited 
applicability to a situation where, as the state argues is the case here, a 
defendant's mental health is not a significant factor at sentencing, and the 
existing evaluations specifically found a lack of any major mental illness to treat 
or analyze. 
However, the existing evaluations did address these criteria with regard 
to the factors that did precipitate Childers' crimes - Childers' substance abuse 
and his criminal sexual proclivities. The substance abuse evaluation specifically 
recommended Level II Intensive Outpatient therapy and discussed Childers' 
"readiness to change," benefits to ceasing substance use through treatment, and 
the negative impacts of continued substance use. (9/21/11 Substance Abuse 
Evaluation, pp.2, 5-7.) The psychosexual evaluation specifically recommended 
sex offender and anger management treatment and indicated Childers may 
benefit from psychotropic medications. (9/12/11 Psychosexual Evaluation, 
pp.17-18.) The psychosexual evaluator also thoroughly analyzed Childers' risk 
to re-offend and discussed both the potential benefits to sex offender treatment 
(helping Childers learn to develop mature intimate relationships and control his 
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impulsive activity), and the risks of nontreatment (sex offenders who do not 
receive or who drop out of sex offender treatment are at an increased risk of 
recidivism). (Id., pp.12-18.) 
Finally, the district court properly exercised its discretion in light of the late 
nature of Childers' request. By waiting until the sentencing hearing to request 
the district court to order an additional psychological evaluation, Childers was 
essentially requesting a continuance of the sentencing hearing. The district court 
declined Childers' request. A court has the "inherent power to regulate its 
calendar, to efficiently manage the cases before it." Department of Labor and 
Indus. Serv. v. East Idaho Mills, Inc., 111 Idaho 137, 138-39, 721 P.2d 736, 737-
38 (Ct. App. 1986) (internal citations omitted). In this instance, Childers' rape 
victim and her family were present in the courtroom for sentencing, and the 
prosecutor indicated that they had made some sacrifices to be present, and were 
anxious for closure in the case. (Tr., p.27, Ls.12-24.) While a district court is, on 
occasion, required to order a psychological evaluation or additional psychological 
evaluation on its own initiative, the state submits that, to the extent that the 
record does not require a court to do so, an untimely request for an evaluation 
may weigh against the defendant's request. Otherwise, convicted felons would 
have an incentive to engage in gamesmanship and discourage victim 
participation at sentencing hearings by making last-minute requests for additional 
evaluations. 
There was no reason to believe Childers' mental health would be a factor 
at sentencing, and the district court had access to adequate information about 
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Childers' mental health through the existing evaluations and other information. 
Therefore, Childers has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
in declining his last-minute request to order an additional mental health 
evaluation. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Childers' sentences 
DATED this 7th day of June, 2012. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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